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CLD-136        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-3839 
___________ 
 
IN RE: GEORGE K. TRAMMELL, III, 
Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the District of Delaware 
(Related to D. Del. No. 1-17-cv-01448) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 21 
March 1, 2018 
 
Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 1, 2018) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
 Pro se petitioner George K. Trammell seeks a writ of mandamus.  Because 
Trammell has not demonstrated that he is entitled to such relief, we will deny his petition. 
 In October 2017, Trammell attempted to remove a Delaware state court 
foreclosure case to the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Trammell claimed that he had an interest in real property that was at issue in the case.  
However, Trammell was not a party to the case, despite an unsuccessful attempt to 
intervene in the matter.  The state court does not appear to have received notice of 
Trammell’s attempted removal, and the property was sold in November 2017 at a court-
ordered sheriff’s sale.  In December 2017, the District Court remanded the case to the 
state court because Trammell was not a “defendant” within the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 
1441(a) who could remove the case.  Trammell filed his mandamus petition in this Court 
shortly thereafter.  He also sought reconsideration in the District Court, which was 
denied, and has separately appealed the District Court’s decisions. 
 A writ of mandamus is a “drastic remedy” that may only be granted in 
“extraordinary circumstances in response to an act amounting to a judicial usurpation of 
power.”  In re Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005).  
Trammell’s petition indicates that he wishes to have District Court Judge Richard G. 
Andrews recused from his District Court case and seeks to void the state court’s 
judgment that ordered the sheriff’s sale.  “Before a writ of mandamus may issue, a party 
must establish that (1) no other adequate means [exist] to attain the relief he desires, (2) 
the party’s right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable, and (3) the writ is 
appropriate under the circumstances.”  See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 
(2010) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Trammell’s first request appears to be moot, as he no longer has any pending 
matters before Judge Andrews.  We do not have authority to address Trammell’s second 
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request.  See In re Pressman-Gutman Co., Inc., 459 F.3d 383, 399 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Courts 
have used mandamus to confine an inferior [federal] court to a lawful exercise of its 
prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do 
so.”) (internal quotation mark omitted); In re Campbell, 264 F.3d 730, 731 (7th Cir. 
2001) “[W]e cannot, as a general rule . . . use our power to . . . interfere with state court 
litigation, thus exceeding our jurisdiction”); Demos v. U.S. Dist. Court For E. Dist. of 
Wash., 925 F.2d 1160, 1161 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that federal courts “lack[] 
jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to a state court”); Moye v. Clerk, DeKalb Cty. 
Superior Court, 474 F.2d 1275, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973) (“[A] federal court lacks the general 
power to issue writs of mandamus to direct state courts . . . in the performance of their 
duties where mandamus is the only relief sought.”); Haggard v. State of Tenn., 421 F.2d 
1384, 1386 (6th Cir. 1970) (“[F]ederal courts have no authority to issue writs of 
mandamus to direct state courts . . . in the performance of their duties.”); cf. Exxon Mobil 
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (holding that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-
court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered 
before . . . district court proceedings commenced and inviting . . . review and rejection of 
those judgments.”).  Thus, there is no basis for granting Trammell’s petition. 
